The activation of social policies coincides with the growing trend to give all local actors (i.e. civil officers, social partners, non profit associations, job-seekers themselves.
The emergence of new patterns of public action and its significance
The last two decades witnessed a threefold evolution of social policies in the field of labour market integration and struggle against unemployment, which is by now well documented (e.g. OECD 1998; Barbier et al.; Thuy et al., 2001; EEO, 1997; Gilbert and Van Voorhis, 1998; etc.) . a) activation: first, a shift from passive measures (i.e. cash benefits provided on the basis either of citizenship or of previous payment record, without further behavioural requirement on behalf of the job-seeker) to active programmes, in which the benefit payment is conditioned by the appropriate behaviour of the recipient, esp. concerning her efforts to get back to the labour market as quickly as possible. This first shift is usually captured as the move from decommodification to recommodification, where social policies are subordinated to labour market objectives as illustrated by the current focus on employability. This tendency puts a heavier burden on the beneficiaries who, besides having an adequate payment record, are called upon to comply with behavioural norms such as active job search; b) individualisation: second, a move towards individual measures, thus substituting the standardised programmes of conventional social policies based on pre-defined categories of social risk (e.g. oldage, unemployment, disability, etc.) by individualised, tailor-made policies. At the same time, macroeconomic demand-side policies give way to supply-side interventions, be it that the cause of unemployment is considered to lie with the unemployed or that the reform of the labour market is thought to be out of reach of the political will or capacity. In the same perspective, servicing states (e.g. training programmes or childcare) tend to complement, or sometimes replace, welfare states and cash compensation, and they are envisaged as the main weapon to struggle against unemployment and social exclusion; c) territorialisation: the third trend, the territorialisation of social policies, naturally derives from the first two tendencies. In order to individualise social policies and orient them towards activation of benefit recipients, new responsibilities and freedom of action are conferred to local actors in general (i.e. local civil officers, social partners, non profit associations, private employment agencies, and job-seekers themselves). This means a significant departure with the conventional welfare state, where local actors were envisaged mostly as mere executive tools in the hand of the central government (in the case of civil officers) or as corporatist groups unable to take into account the common good of the local collectivity (in the case of NGOs, such as trade unions or third sector groups -see Bonvin and Bertozzi 2001) . From the eighties onwards, the pitfalls of the top-down procedure have been abundantly documented, and local approaches are increasingly recommended by organisations such as the OECD (cf. territorial flexibility, OECD 1998) or the EU ).
The postulate underlying those recommendations is that the setting up of an autonomous local employment service will be able to better mobilise the local players' knowledge and goodwill and, consequently, to design more appropriate programmes and adjust them in much shorter time. Thus, local actors are increasingly considered as partners in the definition of the common good of the collectivity. The focus on the local dimension of employment policies coincides with a rescaling of welfare, which in turn entails significant changes in the way policies are designed, implemented and assessed.
This threefold change entails an in-depth reshuffling of the policy process: the classical distinction between the three stages of this process (i.e. the normative step or the policy design, the pragmatic one coinciding with policy implementation, the evaluative one or policy assessment), useful to describe a clear-cut policy process where the stages are neatly distinguished, does not hold as strictly as it used to. The classical welfare state was characterised by a functional and temporal separation and distribution of responsibilities (i.e. parliament and central government in charge of designing appropriate legislation, civil officers confined to its strict implementation with very little margin for initiative and assessment achieved only ex post mostly by independent actors), which entailed a considerably reduced capacity to adjust policies quickly, since evaluation resulted only ex post (and not continuously, i.e. all along the programme), and only after such assessment could the policy process be triggered again in order to adapt legislation to changing circumstances. By contrast, evaluation has become a most important stage in contemporary social policies, it has pervaded the whole policy process, thereby calling for a greater reactivity or reflexivity of legislative provisions and practices that have to constantly adjust.
The new pattern of social policy relies on the permanent interconnection and interdependence between the three stages, which allows a much quicker adjustment when necessary.
Whereas the designing stage was the key to the whole policy process in the previous procedure, implementation and evaluation are now playing a crucial part, since the margin for interpretation left to local actors is much greater. But this reliance on local actors does not coincide with a hollowing out of the central State's role. Rather, the State has amended its policy instruments in order to be able to efficiently monitor civil officers' practices and benefit recipients' behaviours. This implies a constant resorting to evaluating tools concerning both local agents (submitted to stringent contractual requirements fixing quantitative targets) and benefit recipients in order to check the appropriateness of their behaviour. Follow-up and monitoring of the local actors' interventions are then essential components of such programmes, which accounts for the present trend towards benchmarks, indicators and the like. Thus, the new focus on the local dimension does not imply the weakening of the welfare state, but a new combination of the central and the local level involved in the policy process.
Classical statistical indicators are not able to grasp the scope and significance of such a transformation, and new analytical tools need to be designed. As a promising alternative, we suggest in the next paragraph to use the notion of capability for voice.
An alternative analytical framework: capability for voice
One dimension that is key to the territorialisation of social policies is then the capability of all local actors to express their concerns and make them heard in the policy process.
Following Amartya Sen's perspective (Sen 1992 (Sen , 1999 , we suggest to call this capability for voice, i.e. the ability to express one's true opinions and thoughts (vs. adaptive preferences) and to make them count in the course of public discussion. In our view, this notion of capability for voice adequately captures the promises conveyed by localism in welfare policies. The next paragraphs propose an in-depth analysis of this notion and of its potential impact on policy processes and outcomes. We will then compare actual local practices in Switzerland against this analytical framework.
Capability for voice is particularly significant in all rule-setting processes: undoubtedly, rules or policies would be designed, implemented and assessed in very different ways if all concerned citizens were really capable to participate effectively in all stages of the policy process. Ideally, equality in the capability for voice should result in the inclusion of all citizens in the deliberative process, which requires the neutralisation of all forms of influence -such as power, social inequalities, wealth, discriminating practices, ideology, etc. -that could prevent access to the deliberative arena or undermine the effectiveness of one's voice in the public debate. Politics consists in defining the targets to be attained through collective action, it has in it an irreducibly normative or prescriptive factor, and the notion of capability for voice requires that the definition of such normativity be not the prerogative of specific groups, but be equally shared by all members of society.
This especially holds for the new active, individualised and territorialised social policies.
Indeed, individualisation of labour market policies is inherently ambivalent since it may be used (or abused) as a tool to discipline individuals in order to make them comply with social or technical norms defined by experts or policy-makers (or by any other holder of authority in a given environment), without any consultation of the people concerned, i.e. the beneficiaries.
Sociological studies abundantly document such a trend in which individual beneficiaries of social policies are compelled to adapt to the prevailing social or cultural norms, i.e. to adjust their individual behaviours to the social, political, economic, etc. environment. Such pressure exerted by the prevailing system of norms over the weakest members of the social group is perverting the very rationale of individualised social policies. Indeed, if the individual is conceived as a passive recipient and not as an active citizen, if she is called to comply with norms she has contributed neither to design, nor to implement nor to assess, then individualised policies can be said to subordinate the individual to society. By contrast, the capability perspective brought about by Amartya Sen strives to define individualised policies that truly promote the individuals' autonomy, not only as an end-product of the policy but throughout the whole policy process. The focus on the beneficiaries' capability for voice implies the active involvement of the individual in the rule-setting process, e.g. the active participation of the benefit recipients to the activation process. In this perspective, policy outcomes and policy processes are strictly connected, and it is not appropriate to impose specific views of the good or right behaviour on passive citizens. In other words, capabilityfriendly outcomes require capability-friendly processes. This view calls for the setting up of a genuinely public space, where all public policies are to be open to public discussion and dialectical interaction.
This requirement holds for all stages of the policy process, where concerned citizens ought to be equally involved. Indeed, if the designing process (or the normative stage of policy-making) is confiscated by experts or policy-makers, it implies that the people's needs will be defined beforehand, without any concern for the specificity of individual situations.
Then, the recipients' needs, wishes, expectations, etc. are predetermined and imposed on the weakest. This in turn considerably restricts the autonomy of the people in charge of policy implementation and assessment: their margin for manoeuvre is strictly limited by the requirements of technical compliance with predefined objectives. They are called to act as efficient translators of the expert or bureaucratic view in the targeted public. Hence, the capability for voice of the civil officers in charge of implementation and assessment is significantly restricted, and this prevents them from taking into account the wishes, expressed by the recipients. In such cases, policy-makers frame a priori the issues, and the definition of the recipients' needs is taken for granted, as if it were self-evident and beyond dispute (Fraser, 1988) . For instance, in most OECD countries employability is imposed as an indisputable objective, whereas there are many possible ways to envisage the place of work in human life.
Then, local agents in charge of policy implementation are constrained to abide by this target formulated in quantitative terms (cf. 70 % of employment rate in the European Employment Strategy), which considerably limits their scope for personal initiatives or for taking into account the individual circumstances of their "clients". If capability for voice is negated at the level of the definition of the needs, it will not be able to develop at the implementation level (where it is strictly framed by the priorities fixed at the designing level) and at the assessment stage (where quantity tends to prevail over concerns about the quality of work). By contrast, the capability approach requires to provide the implementers and evaluators with more capability for voice in order to allow them to better integrate the concerns voiced by the beneficiaries. To use Fraser's words, what is required is a genuine politics of needs interpretation, which implies the setting up of devices in order to neutralise the asymmetries of power or knowledge between all the actors involved. If capability for voice is to be taken seriously, it implies that a dialectical interaction is allowed to take place at all stages of the policy process, and that all these spaces of public dialogue may impact on the whole rulesetting process.
This issue of the relationship between the three stages of the public policy process is classically captured through the distinction between top-down and bottom-up policies. The "new public management" approach aims at defining highly formalised objectives (quantitative input or output, very precise directives concerning the modes of policy implementation) in order to dominate the implementing process and avoid any inopportune initiative in this field: to some extent, this amounts to a Taylorisation of public action. By contrast, reflexive law calls for the involvement of all partners, equally able to express their views and to impact on all stages of the public policy process. What is guaranteed in this second option is not precise outcomes, but the real freedom to effectively (i.e. not symbolically) participate to the public debate. This brief account shows the requirements that social integration policies are called to fulfil. As mentioned above, this field is characterised by the growing significance of individualised social policies and of local practices, especially in the field of employment policies. Activating job-seekers requires assessing their capacities, which cannot be achieved independently of the context, and requires in-situation, contextualised judgements. The situated and procedural dimension of the capability approach is crucial: if individual circumstances, needs, expectations, etc. are to be duly taken into account, then the prominent role of local agencies ought not to be impinged by centrally designed policies. What is required by the capability approach is not the abrogation of all cash entitlements and standardised measures, but their combination with tailor-made measures able to take into account the individual circumstances and to tackle more efficiently social exclusion. This approach is close to what Skocpol labels "targeting within universalism", which envisages individual and universal interventions as complementary (Skocpol, 1995) .
Let us put it clear that the ideal situation where everybody may improve their capabilities without any limitation whatsoever is not achievable, and this makes for the necessity to define trade-offs or compromises via social choice procedures. Therefore, capabilities do not coincide with the absence of any constraint or restriction, but they do require the social and democratic, i.e. deliberative, construction of such constraints. Indeed, when defined at the central level (by policy-makers, bureaucrats or experts), the constraints or limitations inherent in all rule-setting processes, may be interpreted as factors of oppression by the beneficiaries of the programmes. The reflexive movement between the three moments of the policy process is not allowed to take place. In order to make sense, this must take place at the level of local public situated action with the setting-up of a so-called situated State (Storper and Salais, 1997) .
This also requires a straight combination of individual and collective dimensions: a) the individual's capability to express herself in an understandable and convincing way, b) her capability to be listened to, i.e. the availability of the surrounding institutions to receive this message and to treat it fairly, without distorting it (rather than imposing a pre-constructed conception of what public policies should achieve). Thus, in the case of the job-seeker, the capability to express oneself is not enough. The role of institutions is crucial, since they may either enhance or impede the development of the capability for voice. Even if very competent in voicing their concerns, individuals facing institutions that are unable or unwilling to listen to them will not develop their capabilities. Indeed, top-down policies impose a specific informational basis of justice, and do not allow local actors to design their own public action.
By the same token, they convey a naturalised approach of what people ought to be, to which individual job-seekers are then called upon to adapt themselves. By contrast, in Sen's perspective, centrally designed policies ought to be conceived in such a way as to allow local actors to have their say in the policy process.
Following Bohman, we then suggest to take into account three main conditions for achieving genuine capability for voice (Bohman, 1996) :
-equality of access to the process: in order to prevent any abuse or discrimination, all institutional arrangements are to favour the most equal distribution of power -any advantage conceded to a specific category at the expense of all others should be abrogated. The objective here is not formal equality of participation, but real equality of access to the public debate, i.e. equal capability of expressing one's views and of being listened to. Obviously, such a large conception entails more than a formal freedom to express oneself. It indeed requires that all factors of inequality such as power, wealth or social norms be neutralised;
-publicity of the deliberation process in order to avoid any discretionary use of the decision-making power;
-freedom of speech guaranteed to everyone involved in the deliberation (which implies the avoidance of any pressure or sanction, that could threaten anyone's freedom of thought).
In order to achieve such political equality between each and every citizen, all inequities preventing the deliberative uptake of less powerful speakers are to be tackled. This covers a very wide range, from economic inequality to more subtle mechanisms imposing cultural forms or styles of political communication (Bohman, 1996) .
The next paragraph will present the results obtained via the application of this requiring framework of analysis to the case of Switzerland. Our investigation will focus on the local implementation of the federal unemployment insurance (henceforward LACI).
Empirical Observations in Switzerland

Central Level and Local Policies
From the nineties onwards, Swiss public administrations widely opened to the precepts of new public management (NPM) in the hope of improving their efficiency through the introduction of private sector rules of management, flexibilisation of administrative work organisation through decentralisation of decisional competencies and at last improvement of the quality of the services offered to the citizens, now called customers. NPM aims at transposing the managerial rigour supposedly specific to the private sector in the public services (Osborne, Gaebler, 1993 , quoted in Varone, Bonvin, 2004 . The Swiss jobcentres, the regional placement offices (RPOs), are called upon to implement these new precepts in the field of employment policies where the principles of activation, individualisation and territorialisation interact. Revisions of the federal law on the unemployment insurance, which followed one another at a fast pace were marked clearly by the concern of saving public money. To that purpose, one of their main ambitions was to make RPOs the "pioneers of new public management"
1 . Let us examine the principal features of this model and the consequences of its implementation in the public employment services.
• only based on the legislative description of the placement activity; due to the difficulty to formalise such tasks, it underestimates the diversity of the qualitative work to be done, which nevertheless is essential to take into account the diversity of the situations and the socio-medical problems of some beneficiaries. This ambition to monitor and control the local actors' work proves all the more problematic in the case of public services provided to other people, which cannot be assimilated to conventional productive activities. In this case, the goal of monitoring and controlling significantly impinges on the local actors' capability for voice;
• The practice of benchmarking, aimed at identifying the best practices in order to diffuse their positive aspects with the objective of improving the LACI effectiveness, follows from the same logic. The criteria or basis of judgement selected to define which practices are the best ones appears of crucial importance in these benchmarking practices. In Switzerland, the seco decided to classify the RPOs according to the four performance indicators defined previously. On this basis cantons with the best results were granted a financial bonus amounting to a maximum of 5% of their budget 2 . An econometric model, managed by the consulting firm ATAG, was used to weight this classification by taking into account the peculiarities of cantonal situations. Even the most informed local actors could not understand why they were well or badly classified by this scheme. Apart from the inefficiency to locate the heavily sought-after best practices, these mechanisms of benchmarking have contributed to put local agencies in competition. Indeed, central authorities can exert more pressure on those displaying the lowest performance indicators.
As local agencies try to stay in the top of the classification (or at least not to appear near its end), there are cases of competition between agencies for the acquisition of vacant slots. As an example, the officers prospecting for vacancies inside the firms, frequently wait during one day before making these slots available to their colleagues from other agencies, in order to give priority to "their" job-seekers.
• Thirdly, the focus on reducing the production costs of public services leads to accelerate the benefit recipients' return on the labour market, or in case this proves impossible, their radiation from the unemployment dole. This means that, if the economic situation gets worse, the definition of a suitable job will be re-examined downwards in order not to slow down the pace of professional integration. Just like in workfare programmes, the unemployed will then be constrained, under the threat of sanctions, to accept precarious and badly remunerated jobs (Lødemel, Trickey, 2001) . In a first stage, this implied a significant cost transfer to other social insurances (notably disability) or to social assistance. But recent legislative reforms are introducing the activation principle in these competing fields in order to reduce their caseload too. Thus, social assistance beneficiaries are increasingly asked to accept public utility jobs in exchange for higher benefits and the decommodification level provided by the disability insurance is also reduced, so that its • Fourthly, the focus on outcomes rather than on proceedings involves the attribution of global budgets which may lead to budgetary dependence (Giauque 2004) . This is especially significant when we know that NPM favours the management of administrative units by managers whose freedom to use the resources placed at their disposal is increased. For instance, Swiss RPOs are receiving each year a determined sum of money from the federal administration for each job-seeker. This sum is inversely proportional to the rate of unemployment. This isn't due to a simple economy of scale, because these differences don't arise from the number of unemployed, but are based on other parameters such as the unemployment rate. Thus, 10'000 job-seekers in Geneva will bring less money than 10'000 job-seekers in Bern which has more inhabitants . Because of the unforeseeable character of the economic evolution, which is the main factor influencing the unemployment rate, local managers sometimes hesitate before undertaking some necessary investments (additional recruitment, acquisition of new buildings); such a situation can only worsen the staff's working conditions.
• Lastly, the concern for guaranteeing a certain freedom of choice to the users leads to the introduction of a "focus on customers", if not in practice at least in speech. It would nevertheless be wrong to think that it might imply a better adaptation to the job-seekers' individual needs. Indeed, the customers of the local agencies are the firms, that have to be convinced to hire people that they sometimes themselves fired. RPOs are offering them free services such as job search, selection and placement. Active measures are also proposed in the form of hiring subsidies, training allowances and professional training courses. Such services mainly intend to reduce the costs of finding (via brokerage service) and hiring (job subsidies and upgrading of competencies) labour force. They may be defined as optional services creating attractive (in financial terms) opportunities for firms.
By contrast, active measures are usually compulsory for the unemployed, when they do not boil down to a simple job-readiness test. Hence, the focus on customers generally means a focus on the firms' wishes. In consequence, the job-seekers' re-qualification, through work placement or training courses, is only envisaged if it meets a real need on the labour market.
To sum up, the local actors' room to manoeuvre appears to be narrowly framed by budgetary and output constraints fixed by the central government, and it also has to adjust to the needs of the local labour market. The logic of the firm plays a prevalent role, even if the results of its application in civil services are not always those expected. Capability for voice is then narrowly limited since no action is taken up to reduce the inequities observed between all local actors.
Reforming Public Policies: a Reflexive Process?
This model of NPM is also characterised by the frequency of legislative reforms. To assess the various partners' degree of involvement in these processes, we will examine the case of the provision agreement between the cantons and the Federal Department of Economy. The implementation of this agreement in 2000 brought about critical voices, esp. among jobcentre managers. These criticisms related to a) the fact that placement was assessed against its speed rather than against durability, b) the competition between cantons, which goes against the idea of federalism and which impedes collaboration between cantons instead of encouraging it, and c) the fact that cantonal authorities put strong pressure on their RPOs to obtain results at all costs, generating disastrous effects such as pressure on jobseekers so that they leave unemployment, or are declared inapt to work, or accept any available work. There were also sharp criticisms against the mode of calculation used in the benchmarking process, due to its lack of transparency and dubious utility. Comparison between cantons should no more be interpreted as a source of competition, however the new agreement specifies that the cantons for which negative evaluations are observed have to submit to a specific assessment of their situation. Geneva, the worst ranked canton in 2002 and the one with the highest unemployment rate, is the "pilot-canton" for this 4 Article 122c, Al. 5, OACI optimisation process. A discussion between cantonal and federal authorities led the former to take steps in order to improve the job-seekers' follow-up. Concretely, there is a new requirement of a monthly interview during the first six months of unemployment and a call for a stricter enforcement of sanctions with the objective of reaching the average rate of sanctions in the Swiss RPOs, which in 2002 was 2.25 times higher than that of Geneva. In addition the canton has to set up a longer training period for its agents (two times longer than before). This process is currently under way and its overall scope arouses many negative reactions among local officers who see their room for manoeuvre much reduced, whatever the quality of their previous job. Furthermore, cantons were getting their results six or twelve months later, so it was even more difficult to adjust their management in due time. The seco commissioned a lot of studies to find how to quicken the beneficiaries' exit of the unemployment insurance. Theses studies focused mainly on macro-economic or psychological factors, like the dissuasive effect of sanctions (Lalive, van Ours, Zweimüller, 2002) , but it proved impossible to identify the best way to improve the individual follow-up (Atag, Ernst & Young 1999). Individualisation and standardisation don't combine that easily.
Implementing Active Policies
After an overview of the general framework in which the unemployment insurance is applied, the following pages will consider how these policies are implemented and what is their impact on the jobcentres' staff and on the job-seekers. We will see to what degree they support the people's autonomy or instead subject them to externally defined objectives. Our presentation will develop along the three axes identified in the introductory paragraph.
a) activation
For job-seekers, activation implies that any benefit is conditioned by their adequate behaviour directed towards their quick reintegration on the labour market. Among those obligations, they have to attend monthly interviews; present themselves, when asked, to employers who announced a vacancy to the jobcentre, provided this job is considered suitable to their situation in terms of salary, qualification, and travelling distance. Job-seekers can also be called upon to take part in labour market measures; and of course they have to carry out job searches in a determined number according to their personal situation and the state of the local labour market. The law stipulates clearly that people who do not fulfil these duties are to be sanctioned through temporary benefit suspension. Thus, there is no need for beneficiaries to abuse the unemployment insurance to be sanctioned, not agreeing with the subjective assessment of their situation is a sufficient motive if they refuse to abide by the measures consecutive to this assessment. Obligations can prove poorly efficient: the monthly job queries made by job-seekers in order to avoid sanctions for insufficient research often only contribute to swamp firms with job queries.
The software used by front line staff to match unemployed and vacancies and to provide general statistics at the central level is framing the interaction between front line staff and beneficiaries (Wright 2001 ), but it is also a tool allowing to control the administrative work. It provides very detailed statistics on the advisers' work and on the job-seekers' personal characteristics and behaviour. In practical terms, the planning of all meetings with the beneficiaries shows up in a centralised database, where everyone can check his colleagues' job, as well as the files of all job-seekers registered in the jobcentre. Managers at the regional level have a direct access to all the files of their area, whereas the federal civil servants can view all Switzerland. They carry RPOs controls every two years in order to check the observance of the regulations concerning sanctions and other activation measures. Jobcentres whose staff forgot, intentionally or not, to sanction job-seekers in accordance with the law get fines corresponding to the sanctions which were not inflicted.
The use of a single software for all Swiss jobcentres aims at connecting all RPOS in order to make their work more efficient (e.g. by making all job offers available to all RPOs).
However, it also contributes to standardising the work of the local officers and thus reduces their room to manoeuvre, as well as the extent and diversity of the informational basis used to evaluate their job and, most importantly, job-seekers. Moreover, it increases the share of administrative work (from 30 to 60% according to our interviews). In consequence, time devoted to the follow-up of the unemployed tends to get reduced (Wright 2001 ) and standardised (30 minutes at most for interviews). As each officer manages 120 to 180 files, has to take part in weekly meetings, register new beneficiaries, attend training sessions or supervisions, it is very likely that part of his task will be fulfilled mechanically or that the most difficult cases will be neglected in order to reach the quantitative indicators imposed on him.
The official purpose of labour market policies (LMP) is to maintain or develop the beneficiaries' employability. Job-seekers can ask for training courses. However this is not a right, it is the officer's responsibility to grant it or not, i.e. to decide whether or not a training programme suits the individual professional and educational trajectory and the needs of the local labour market (generally it is not possible to request training for a job in which you never worked before or for which you were not trained before, except if there is a strong need for this kind of job on the local labour market). Employability in jobcentres is thus measured with reference to the needs of the local labour market. Following a training course does not exempt from job queries, and must be interrupted to take an available job even if precarious (provided it has been defined as suitable). Most of the training offered consists in short programmes (from one day up to three months) and the most visited teaches job-seekers how to candidate themselves in a more efficient way. The beneficiaries' concerns are sometimes, especially in this case, far away from those of the jobcentres, all the same the law considers refusing a LMP as equivalent to refusing a suitable job and imposes heavy sanctions in both cases (benefit suspension until 1.5 month 5 ). Administrative appeal mechanisms do exist, and in case of further contest, the job-seekers may resort to cantonal or even federal courts, but such a procedure is quite heavy and unemployed are quite reluctant to resort to it..
b) individualisation
The move towards individualisation involves greater responsibilities for the front-line staff, the one that Lipsky (1980) calls street-level bureaucrats. These people are in an intermediary position between the various actors of the labour market, they can be called mediators in Granovetter's (1973) words. On the one hand, they have to establish confidence relationships with the firms in order to persuade them to announce their vacancies to the jobcentre, on the other hand they have to assess the jobseekers' employability in order to set up tailor-made individualised action plans (Freyssinet 2000) . At the same time, as the agents of a public administration, they have to follow and enforce its rules. Their performances are indeed evaluated according to quantitative job placement objectives. Ultimately, the constraints rising from management by objectives have the strongest repercussion on front line staff.
They have to face up the pressure resulting from the labour market, but above all, it is the obligations of results associated with the precariousness of the available means that makes these situations hard to manage (Dubet 2002 ).
On the side of job-seekers, individualisation mostly consists in adapting the obligations resulting from activation to the job-seekers' personal characteristics. The propensity to inflict sanctions varies according to the civil officers in charge, some unemployed can be exempted from job queries, or have a lower interview frequency. We observed that individualised policies tend to reinforce existing inequalities. For instance, women with very young children are more often than their male counterparts placed in temporary subsidised jobs in order to test their availability for a job, in this case what is tested is whether or not they have someone to look after their children. Executives tend to be less often compelled to accept a job, because for them being explicitly labelled as unemployed might be damageable to a future hiring.
Such cautions do not seem to apply to less qualified people or those carrying on manual jobs, who are on the whole more often suspected to flout the law.
c) territorialisation
Within the framework laid down at the central level, territorialisation ought to contribute to increase the local actors' room to manoeuvre. However, the effective role played by local civil officers is narrowly framed by the law and the directives decided at the federal and cantonal 5 These sanctions range from 31 to 60 days of benefit suspension (benefits are paid for working days). levels. It is very difficult for them to have an effective voice about these policies. To be heard, their concerns have to pass on a lot of hierarchical and geographical levels.
Jobcentres hire staff specifically in charge of relations with firms. They have to get in touch with the companies of the area, introduce their vacancies into the computerised database and check if the jobs are suitable according to the law and collective agreements. As jobcentres cannot prospect outside their area, so they set up various strategies. For instance, a jobcentre will develop temporary placement even if it is contrary to the concept of durability contained in the law. Officers in general still keep contact with their previous professional environment and stress the importance to have a network. They pretend not to grant too much importance to the evaluation and classification of RPOs. Still, competition between agencies exist on this ground, but it is rather the number of files and the administrative constraints which dictates the work rhythm.
Territorialisation thus allows a certain room to manoeuvre, however limited by the possibilities of the economic environment and by the job-seekers' profiles. For the agency management as well as for the officers, it implies an adaptation to the local labour market to achieve the goals laid down by the law. Territorialisation is above all related to the availability of jobs in the area.
RPOs don't create jobs, but rather seek to develop partnerships with firms. However, many companies have a bad image of job-seekers and jobcentres, and private agencies keep 70% of the placement market. This fact sometimes leads to a paradoxical case where a contractor contacts a private agency which addresses itself to the public agency in order to find the person with the requested profile. Two logics clash here, that of public agencies which goal is to quickly place the unemployed on the labour market in order to limit the caseload and that of private profit-making agencies. Thus the public service works for free for private agencies which then make profit with the employers. RPOs' situation is made even more difficult because private agencies privilege the most qualified job-seekers, so public agencies are left with the hardest to place. Certain officers also mention that the firms filing up vacancies to the public agencies are often those which cannot afford the fees of private agencies or which have a high turnover.
The relation of the advisers -in particular of the interfaces -to the firms is often ambivalent.
If on one side the contacts are described as excellent, on the other relations within the firms are sometimes depicted in an extremely negative way. They mention pressures, fear and stress. Officers also note that firms are more and more looking for "the world's wonder". If an officer finds that a beneficiary does not sufficiently fit the requested profile, he might ask her to make a spontaneous application rather than assign her to a suitable job, as directives require, because there is a risk to ruin the jobcentre's credibility among the firms. A vague description, such as "looking for a computer scientist", also proves problematic, because a lot of jobs-seekers can be assigned to it. Firms have to send back forms about the behaviour of the job-seeker (did he come? Did you hire him? Why not ?…). Often, when they are filled, these forms are not reliable since employers who receive fifty assigned job-seekers don't always remember all the facts. On this dubious basis, job-seekers can be heavily sanctioned if they don't justify themselves ten days after the letter from the jobcentre requesting them to account for their failure.
The jobcentres' real efficiency in terms of placement is difficult to determine, because statistics can't indicate the reasons for which a person found a job. Indeed one never knows to what extent a hiring can be attributed to the RPO's activity or to economic improvement. If someone finds himself the job, it is no easy to say whether the training he got while unemployed had a decisive effect on his hiring.
The three dimensions of employment policies -i.e. activation, individualisation and territorialisation have been tackled separately but in practice they are strongly intermingled and interact one on another. The previous paragraphs show that front-line staff is often "sandwiched" between administrative requirements, technocratic designs (which take very
little account of what local actors live daily) and economic constraints. Despite a few internal contradictions, the administrative and economic logics tend to converge and limit the local actors' and the jobseekers' margin of autonomy.
Conclusion
Our fieldwork has evidenced two types of limitations preventing genuine capability for voice to prevail: financial and technical constraints. Financial constraints arise both from the scarcity of public financial resources and from the mechanisms used to distribute the available money. In New Public Management, financing is often fully granted only after predefined objectives are reached. And only central actors are able to change the rules of the financial game. Our investigation also shows that, following the logic of performance indicators, the NPM financial mechanisms provide cantons displaying the highest unemployment rate with the lowest funding, thus contributing to increase their officers' workload. Technical constraints refer to the tools imposed by the federal level on advisers, primarily the software they use, which precisely prescribes how interviews have to take place, how long they must be, how often they have to happen, etc. Cantons have a real room to manoeuvre in deciding how they want their work to be organised, and they often use this freedom to develop detailed proceedings. As a result, local staff often can't see any difference between cantonal bureaucracy and federal NPM when it comes to assess the degree of freedom and initiative left to them in their everyday work.
We shall now sum up the evaluation of our empirical case in the light of the 'capability for voice' framework. Our analysis will be articulated around Bohman's identification of the three main requirements in order to grant genuine voice to all actors of a given policy field: equality of access to the policy process, publicity of the deliberation process, freedom of speech. Hence, arbitration processes tend to be privileged at the expenses of deliberation processes, and social justice is guaranteed via the intervention of a third party rather than public discussion. Thus, if we draw on Marshall's typology of rights (Marshall, Bottomore 1992), we can say that the transformation of social rights tends to import the logic of civil rights (and their resort to judicial procedures) rather than that of political rights (and their preference for public deliberation).
c) freedom of speech: This dimension clearly varies according to the actor's degree of power and influence in the policy field. The more we get close to the end of the chain, the more we observe adaptive preferences, essentially due, in the case of jobs-seekers, to the threat represented by the system of sanctions. Genuine preferences are expressed by the most powerful actors whereas local civil officers and benefit recipients have to comply with the centrally defined administrative logic. Thus, Swiss institutions tend to impinge on this specific dimension of capability for voice and thus contribute to produce adaptive preferences.
As we elaborated elsewhere (Bonvin, Moachon, 2003) , active labour market policies can be classified into four ideal-types. We presented these four models along two axes concerning on one hand the objectives pursued by social policies, on the other one the implementation practices mobilised in order to reach these aims. By combining the substantial (content) and the processual (implementation) dimensions of social policies, this tentative typology allows to grasp the variety of active welfare states. The first axis distinguishes between policies aiming at social control (i.e. workfare and social integration) and those struggling for human development (i.e. human capital and capabilities), whereas the second axis assesses the degree of autonomy left to local actors: is their action strictly shaped by centrally defined targets (i.e.
workfare and human capital) or are they allowed to mobilise autonomous initiatives (i.e.
social integration and capabilities)? Crossing the two dimensions leads to the following table. 
Autonomy left to local actors
Social integration Capabilities
The Swiss case investigated in this paper can be classified in-between the "workfare" and the "human capital" ideal-types. Indeed, the Swiss unemployment insurance is a programme shaped at the central level, and the capability for voice left to local actors is strictly limited by centrally designed rules. These empirical observations concerning the Swiss case could well be extended to most NPM-inspired policies, in which capability for voice is restricted with the ambition to strictly monitor local actors' and benefit recipients' actions (Giauque 2004). In the NPM perspective, policy designers are very reluctant to recognise the inalienable freedom of local actors, and NPM figures out as another attempt to neutralise the threat of chaos and anarchy supposedly inherent in genuinely local action. By contrast, capability for voice would imply the abandonment of all such ambition of social engineering and the acceptation of some indeterminacy in the field of public policies. Indeed, a truly capability-friendly State would be reduced to its enabling or capacitating functions (thus leaving to local actors the responsibility to use these opportunities in their own way), rather than seeking to set up yet another formula of social control. In the last analysis, the main teaching of the Swiss experiment is to show the inherent contradiction between the three trends mentioned in introduction as they are implemented in most NPM policies: whereas individualisation and territorialisation point to largely procedural transformations, activation clearly promotes a substantial conception to be imposed on local actors and benefit recipients. As long as activation imposes its logic on the other two trends, the local actors' capability for voice will be impeded, and the call for localising labour market policies will boil down to wishful thinking.
